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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 03/01/2008 Accident number: 457 
Accident time: 07:15 Accident Date: 05/08/2004 
Where it occurred: UNIS-Binas-3 ID 
11287, municipality 
Bugojno 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 12/08/2004 
ID original source: Broj:01-02-4071-2/04 Name of source: BHMAC WL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
metal scrap 
wet 
Date record created: 03/01/2008 Date  last modified: 03/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: y=6 453 046 
x=4879220 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 




This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the 
DDAS. The content of the reports that were made available has been edited for anonymity 
and is summarised below. 
Based on an initial report delivered to BHMAC by the demining organisation on the 10th of 
August 2004, the director of BHMAC formed an investigative committee with the following 
members: [Name removed] (presiding), [Name removed] and [Name removed]. This 
committee created a report which is the main information source for the following summary. 
Another document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining 
Accident on 7 March 2004”, dated 20 Aug 2004, signed by the BHMAC director, [Name 
removed]. This second document contains repeats the investigator’s recommendations and 
the author clearly believed that PPE was not worn at the time of the accident. Another 
document entitled “Measures for Safe Work at Work Site ID 11287” written at BHMAC and not 
signed (possibly not finished or unofficial), dated 13 Aug 2004, contained no new information.  
  
Conditions at the site 
The purpose of the demining task was to enable safe work in the factory “Slavko Rodić”. The 
part next to the fence of the factory was mined. The test site was between the fence and the 
road and between the fence and the buildings. The fence marks the border of the demining 
work-site. There are recorded minefields with 430 mines.  
The accident location was: y=6 453 046 x=4879220. The site is overgrown with bushes and 
trees and there is large amount of metal waste from the factory. The area is flat. It was not 
prepared with a machine, because the number of mines was high and there was a possibility 
that the flail would throw mines onto the safe area. [In other places it seems that it was 
prepared using a machine.] 
At the time of accident, the weather conditions were suitable for work: moderately cloudy, 20° 
C. Prodders could penetrate to 5 cm depth, where a hard layer of soil started. The soil was 
wet.  
 
The work-site layout and marking  
The administrative part of the work-site had been properly marked, according to the SOP and 
the national Standard of B&H. The border of the work-site towards the road and the barbed 
wire was not properly marked. Pegs in the lane where the accident happened were not placed 
at two metre intervals. The places for the disposal of undergrowth were not marked. The 
controlled area and the place for collecting metal fragments were properly marked. The 
locations of found mines were not marked according to the Standard. The found mines were 
marked with pegs wound with a yellow tape because there was no yellow paint available.  
 
Supervision and discipline on the work-site: quality assurance 
Internal control: quality control officer [Name removed], reported on 30 July, 2 August and 5 
August (on the day of accident). On 2nd August he checked a control area of 45 m2 and 
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found no critical mistakes. The area was highly contaminated with metal. All minor mistakes 
were corrected.  
External QA control officer, [Name removed] noted: locations of mines were not marked 
according to SOP; the clearance record was not properly maintained for one lane; daily 
reports were not made according to SOPs; lane 3 was not closed according to the SOP. The 
mistakes were not repeated, but corrected. The productivity was as expected.  
The internal quality control officer [Name removed] has practically dug the whole controlled 
area. This leads to the conclusion that the metal contamination was so high that a full 
excavation is necessary.  
During the investigation after the accident, a can of 7 cm diameter was found in a “cleared” 
area at depth 4-5 cm. A visual examination of the “demined” area revealed an aluminium foil 
20x27 cm with only one mark of a prodder. It was concluded that the area was not treated 
with a prodder, nor with a metal detector. A metal disk with a diameter 12 cm was also found 
on the cleared area.  
The external control officer did not control the cleared area, which is why his estimate of the 
optimum productivity was not correct, due to his lack of experience.  
The removal of mines was not performed according to the SOP and the Standard. We see 
that from the size of the holes where the mines were lying. The holes were only as big as the 
mines. The mines were not destroyed every day, but they were disposed of in the factory 
area.  
The work was organised in two-man teams. The working time contained 10 min breaks after 
every 30 min of work, which is strange because a break is not necessary if the two-man drill is 
used.  
Observing a deminer excavating a can in a working lane, a member of the investigating 
committee noticed a violation of the basic procedures in a working lane: working with a metal 
detector and excavation.  
Overlap on the whole work-site border (i.e. the fence) was not done.  
External control in the form of monitoring was not present.  
 
Communication and connections 
Mobile phones were used.  
 
The accident and the medical support  
The accident happened at 07:15 in the first lane next to the control point, during the 
assignment of deminers to other working lanes. The injured deminer was [Name removed], a 
member of the third two-man team. He was injured in lane 1. The other deminer in his team 
was [Name removed]. His Team leader was [Name removed]. In the days before the accident 
this team had the highest productivity.  
[The Victim] started the work in lane 1. He worked near a metal barrel half buried in the 
ground, 1.6 metres from the fence. Before the accident he cleared 2 m2. He wore his PPE 
and had the necessary tools. He had been removing the undergrowth and surface metal 
pieces ahead of the base stick. He had been searching with his metal detector and had used 
the prodder and a trowel. When he worked only with a prodder, he investigated the whole 
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area ahead of the base stick where the vegetation had been removed. Just before the 
explosion he had not followed this procedure, as he said himself. He prodded ahead of the 
base stick when he activated a mine. He did not prod according to SOP: he penetrated the 
ground and pulled the prodder upwards (pushed the handle downwards) to excavate the soil.  
He probably did not use his metal detector before the explosion: a can and a piece of metal 
tape were found in his lane. He prodded from the border of the area cleared from vegetation 
towards the base stick (in stead of starting from the base stick). He penetrated the ground 
with his prodder and than pushed it towards the ground (so that the top would go up) to make 
it look like the ground had been dug by a trowel. In one moment he pushed on top of a PMA-3 
with the middle of his prodder, and activated it. This is the only way the prodder could be 
damaged in a way it was damaged.  
The scene of accident was disturbed by the police, who performed their investigation before 
the investigating committee of BHMAC.  
Demine r[Name removed] helped deminer [the Victim] after the explosion. He took off his 
helmet with a visor and his frag jacket and took him to the control point. [The Victim] was 
conscious. A paramedic gave him first aid one minute after the explosion. [The Victim] and 
the paramedic went to the hospital in Bugojno. They did not find an ophthalmologist there, so 
they went to Travnik, with the same outcome: [the Victim] was forwarded to Nova Bila 
hospital. There he was checked by an ophthalmologist, who sent him (at 16:00 hours) to 
Koševo ophthalmologic clinic. The day after he went there and stayed at the clinic.  
Injuries: surface injuries of the left side of the face, eye, left arm (he is right-handed). Possible 
eye injuries: we are waiting for a medical report.  
PPE and tools 
PPE (frag jacket, and a helmet with a visor) were found to be lying on the scene of accident. 
The helmet had no marks of explosion. The frag jacket was soiled; there were traces of mud 
on it. Dots of mud expected as a consequence of an explosion were not found on the frag 
jacket (and it may not have been being worn). The traces of mud might have occurred when 
the frag jacket was removed from the deminer after the explosion. A metal detector was not 
found; it had been taken by the police. The prodder was bent on the middle and had obvious 
traces of explosion.  
The mine 
Before the accident, the following mines were found at the work-site: 118 pieces of PMA-3, 2 
pieces of TMA-5, 30 pieces of UXO. During the machine preparation there were 6 explosions.  
The mine causing the accident was a PMA-3, laid in the conventional way.  
 
Conclusion 
The deminer caused the accident by violating the technical and safety procedures proscribed 
in the SOPs of the organisation and in the Standard of B&H. He pressed the prodder towards 
the ground and activated the PMA-3 with the central part of the prodder. This could only 
happen because he started the investigation from ahead, going backwards towards the base 
stick, instead of progressing forward.  
The helmet and the visor do not have any traces of explosion. The deminer’s head injuries 
show that the helmet with the visor was not used properly.  
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The productivity (speed) of the demining team No. 3 was higher than normal for such 
conditions. Also based on found metal pieces, we conclude that the area was not treated 
according to the Standard of B&H. The excavating procedure was also not according to the 
Standard. It does not provide confidence that the area is cleared up to 10 cm depth.  
The marking was not adequate. The responsible persons are the team leader and the work-
site leader. The control failed to notice the unrealistically high productivity. The mines were 
not destroyed on the same day they were found.  
 
Recommendations 
1. to follow SOPs and the Standard 
2. to do better quality control 
3. excavation, retrieval, rendering safe, neutralisation and destruction of mines should 
be according to the standards  
4. to organise one-day training with all teams, to remind them of the requirements of the 
standards 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 604 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital:  
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, short visor 
worn raised 




COMMENT: No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because those in 
charge of the area did not ensure that the Victim followed SOPs/ His visor was raised and he 
working prodding back towards his base-stick and levering the prodder to break the ground. 
The secondary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because there were so 
many errors at the site that the investigators recommended a period of retraining. 
The “Inadequate medical provision” referenced under “Notes” refers to the lack of a 
CASEVAC plan or any knowledge of the capabilities of the hospitals in the vicinity. This, and 
other features of the demining group’s approach to the work implies an amateur lack of 
preparation that would be a severe “Management control inadequacy”. 
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